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Résumé
Dans cet article, nous développons un modèle d’économie politique qui explique la
distribution mondiale des performances environnementales par les choix d’éducation des
agents. Les individus choisissent d’investir (ou pas) en capital humain selon leurs propres
anticipations de ce que sera l’état futur de l’environnement. Par ailleurs, ils votent sur le
niveau d’une taxe qui finance exclusivement la maintenance environnementale fournie par
le gouvernement. Nous montrons que le modèle peut présenter une propriété d’équilibres
multiples et que les anticipations formées par les agents quant à la future qualité environ-
nementale peuvent être auto-réalisatrices lorsque la politique publique instaurée est en-
dogène. Enfin, nous analysons les implications de long-terme d’une politique publique en
faveur de l’éducation, dont dont le but serait de sélectionner le meilleur équilibre.
Codes JEL : I28 ; H20 ; O16 ; O40 ; Q58.
Mots-clef : Qualité environnementale, Capital Humain, Education, Prophéties auto réalisa-
trices, Politique publique.
Abstract
We develop a political economy model that might explain the different environmental
performance of countries, through educational choices. Individuals decide whether to in-
vest in additional education according to their expectations regarding future environmental
quality. They also vote on a tax that will be exclusively used to finance environmental pro-
tection. We show that the model may generate multiple equilibria and agents’ expectations
may be self-fulfilling when the public policy is endogenous. Then, we analyse the long-
term implications of a public policy that would favour education and make it possible to
select the higher equilibrium.
JEL classification:I28; H20; O16; O40; Q58.
Keywords: Environmental Quality, Human capital, Education, Self-fulfilling prophecies,
Public Policy.
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1 Introduction
What can explain or justify the world distribution of environmental performances? The tradi-
tional answer emphasizes the key role played by technology or industrial structure to explain
these long-term discrepancies. More recently, another channel has been put forward: agents’
preferences with regards to the environment. In particular, those preferences are often associ-
ated with a rising income and may help to achieve better environmental conditions. Yet, the
relationship linking the two variables is controversial. Because high-income agents may pro-
tect themselves against environmental hazards, they might be discouraged to support a public
policy in favour of environmental protection. Besides, it has also been highlighted that the
societies that are highly dependent on natural resources, exhibit a strong concern for the en-
vironment. We can think, for instance, about the Indian "tribus" around the Amazon or poor
economies where natural endowment is a crucial factor for further development. Hence, the
relationship between green awareness and income is not straightforward and needs to be more
deeply investigated. In this paper, we propose somemicro-foundations that rely on the choices
of education and life expectancy. Since agents who invest in human capital benefit longer from
the environment, they are more likely to contribute for environmental preservation. In turn,
for similar reasons, a clean environment is an incentive to educate. This complementarity may
lead to multiple equilibria that account for the observed heterogeneity in environmental per-
formances.
The role played by education in the emergence of a green consciousness can be empiri-
cally backed-up. For instance in a study conducted in the USA, Goetz et al. (1998) show that
even after controlling for income, age and others socio-economic factors, environmental quality
was higher in the States where the proportion of agents who have a high school degree is large.
Graduate schooled agents are certainly more aware of environmental risks and outcomes, more
sensitive to green campaigning and prevention, are likely to adopt "sustainable" behaviours,
etc... Broadly speaking, higher human capital allows individuals to perceive the costs and the
benefits of achieving better environmental conditions (see also Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman
(2000), Kahn (2002), Brock & Taylor (2005), Fredriksson et al. (2005), Farzin & Bond (2006)).
This positive relationship may also be captured through the analysis of the "green" vote. In
this respect, Thalmann (2004) and Bornstein & Lanz (2008) show, using the data from a Swiss
referendum on green taxes, that the acceptance and approval of green taxes is higher among
educated agents. Moreover, this evidence can also be illustrated thanks to theWorld Value Sur-
vey data.1 In particular, we can observe that, in OECD countries, highly educated individuals
tend to be more favorable to environmental preservation and may more easily accept the po-
tentiel corresponding fiscal pressure. For instance, at the positive statements "would give a part
of my income for the environment"(see Figure 1a, or "increase in taxes if used to prevent environmental
pollution" below) (see Figure 1b), the proportion of upper educated individuals who strongly
agree or agree amounts to around 65 %; on the contrary, the share of lower educated agents who
are definitely opposed to additional environmental expenditures may amount to 45% in the
first case, and around 35% in the second one.
At an aggregate level, these findings imply that environmental quality might crucially de-
1. TheWorld Value Survey consists in a study dealingwith "values and cultural changes in societies all over the world".
The data are available on the following web site: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Individuals are asked to
answer awide range of assertions concerning their own cultural values. Reported answers are ranged from "strongly
agree" to "strongly disagree".
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(a) "..give a part of income.." (b) "..increase in tax.."
Figure 1. World Value Survey data dealing with environmental actions
pend on the distribution of skills within the population. Typically, a country where the share of
highly educated agents is large, would be more likely to engage itself in environmental protec-
tion or more prone to accept a heavier environmental fiscal pressure. Then, the development
of human capital may be regarded as a complementary (if not alternative) means of achieving
environmental goals, in addition of the more classic instruments, like for instance command-
and-control regulations,... Some empirical data may support these conclusions, such that more
educated economies display better environmental performance. Indeed, using data from the
Center for International Development (CID (2000)) on the secondary school enrollment in 2000
and the Environmental Index Performance (YCELP (2006)), we can observe a positive correla-
tion, as shown in Figure 2, between the two variables.2 The present article aims at capturing
this phenomena through a model of political economy.
In addition, we pay a particular attention to the role played by agents’ expectations with
regards to future environmental quality. Individuals’ forecasts determine the long-term equi-
librium reached by one economy. Yet, in real world and from a political point of view, those
anticipations are well crucial when it comes to implement environmental policies or in order
to modify consumers’ behaviours, etc. Indeed, we can observe that today, political arguments
proposed by regulators and governments are quite pessimistic3, and thereby, tend to shape the
public opinion’s expectations. Broadly speaking, debates often emphasize future environmen-
tal risks and damages that would endanger the population if nothing is done today. These
speeches are made to promote reaction rather than inertia, to develop green awareness, to im-
plement green policies: They influence the way individuals anticipate the future. In our paper,
we do not discuss or reconsider current thoughts and viewpoints; However, we show that op-
timistic expectations might lead to better environmental performance and help to implement
favourable green policies, through the channel of education and life expectancy.
In this paper, we consider a continuum of two-period lived agents who get utility from con-
2. The EPI index was built as a synthetic index of environmental performance. It includes various factors, go-
ing from "environmental health" (indoor pollution, drinking water, adequate sanitation and urban particulates) to
"ecosystems vitality" (air quality, water and productive natural resources, biodiversity). Data are available on-line
at http://epi.yale.edu.
3. Notice that, here, terms "pessimistic" or conversely "optimistic" do not refer specifically to an overweighted or
underweighted estimation of an environmental risk. It only captures the nature of the expectation.
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Figure 2: Correlation between second school enrolment and environmental performance
sumption and environmental quality. During adulthood, when all relevant decisions are taken,
they share their time endowment between education and work. Once agents have acquired
basic skills, they may directly supply unskilled labour to the market. Alternatively, they can
choose to provide skilled labour by investing in additional human capital. In addition, we con-
sider that educated workers exhibit as well a higher life expectancy. The key ingredient of our
setting is that life expectancy determines the marginal utility of the environment: agents who
expect to live longer exhibit stronger concern for the environment since they will benefit more
from it. Consequently, choices of education depend ultimately on agents’ expectations with re-
spect to future environmental quality. When individuals anticipate deteriorated environmental
conditions at next date, they have few incentives to invest in additional human capital and the
proportion of unskilled workers within the population increases. Conversely, when they fore-
cast a clean future environmental quality, they are likely to bear an extra cost of education, to
benefit longer from the environment when old.
Once occupational choices are made, agents vote on the level of the poll tax, which is exclu-
sively used to finance public environmental maintenance. It is shown that optimal willingness-
to-pay for the environment depends crucially on education and so on longevity: a higher life
expectancy increases the level of the preferred tax by raising stronger concern for the envi-
ronment, while it reduces private consumption. This result may be backed up by compelling
evidence, like Goetz et al. (1998), Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman (2000), Brock & Taylor (2005),
that highlight the important role played by both socio-demographic and economic factors, in-
cluding the level of education or health status, in explaining the positive correlation between
the level of education and the public support for environmental protection.
We consider a simple majority voting mechanism so that the political outcome depends
on the current distribution of traits within the population. Hence, if the majority within the
economy is unskilled, the implemented environmental tax is the lower one, and conversely. In
5
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turn, as previously exposed, the median voter’s feature is itself affected by expected future en-
vironmental quality. This dynamic interaction between the economic and political decisions of
individuals may generate multiple equilibria and indeterminacy. In particular, we show that
agents’ expectations regarding future environmental quality may be self-fulfilling. Hence, the
coordination of anticipations on one outcome allows for multiple equilibrium paths with dif-
ferent long-run consequences in terms of both environmental quality and development. On
the one hand, if expectations are coordinated on thinking the future environmental quality to
be good, there is room for an equilibrium path that self-confirms these anticipations: In the
long-run, the economy is driven towards a high equilibrium characterized by a good environ-
mental quality and a more highly educated population. On the other hand, if expectations are
more pessimistic, then skilled workers are a minority. The resulting effort of maintenance pro-
vided publicly is smaller and confirms initial predictions: the economymay be caught in a trap
featured by a poor environment and a majority of unskilled workers.
Finally, the key role played by agents’expectations paves the way for public intervention in
order to select the higher equilibrium. Since in ourmodel, agents vote on environmental policy,
the authorities are not capable of making a commitment on the future environmental quality.
However, the government may aim at encouraging education in order to favour the emergence
of optimistic forecasts and to escape from the trap. Accordingly, we assess the dynamic conse-
quences of public education expenditures whose goal is to stimulate the investment in human
capital. Among available instruments, we choose to model the impact of a reduction in the
fixed cost of education. Public policy is still endogenous, but tax receipts are now used for two
alternative purposes: education and environmental maintenance. We show that if initially the
economy is trapped, public policy may be first detrimental to the environment, while in a sec-
ond step it allows the economy to reach a better overall situation: an improved environment
and a majority of skilled workers. We also underline that the policy design optimally varies
over time. In fact, public policy in favour of education can be temporary; after a while, tax
benefits must again be entirely devoted to environmental protection.
Our paper is related to those articles that have analysed environmental issues in dynamic
OLG framework. In particular, we refer to the setting proposed by John & Pecchenino (1994)
or Ono (2002) to describe the evolution of environmental quality over time. A link can also
be established with the paper of Ikefuji & Horii (2007) who identify a poor-environment trap
associated with a low level of human capital or the one by Mariani et al. (2010) where the trap
is also characterized by a lower life expectancy. However, our analysis contrasts with those
papers as we consider the effort of maintenance being provided publicly, as a consequence
of a political equilibrium. On the contrary, Jouvet et al. (2008) consider the trade-off between
private and public environmental spending, although agents differ, in their framework, in their
behaviour with respect to bequest.
This article is also built on recentmodels of expectation-drivenmultiplicity like Saint Paul &
Verdier (1997), Bisin & Verdier (2000) or Hauk & Saez-Marti (2002), althoughwe concentrate on
more environmental dynamical issues, rather than the mechanism of preference transmission.
Nevertheless, as in these papers we investigate the opportunities of public intervention in order
to select a unique equilibrium. In this respect, our paper may also be related to the article of
Glomm & Ravikumar (1995) who study the dynamic implications of equilibrium selection.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and analyse the dynamic behaviours of the economy. Policy implications are discussed in Sec-
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tion 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The basic framework
Let consider an overlapping generations model where individuals live for two periods. Time
is discrete, t = 0, 1, ... + ∞ and at any date t, there is a continuum of agents of mass 1 being
born. Accordingly, no population growth is considered. Lifespan utility of an agent i, at date t,
writes as:
Uit = c
i
t + pi
i
tEt+1 (1)
It is defined over private consumption (ct) during the first period of life and environmental
quality (Et+1) when old. In our setting, agents could have valued the environment during their
first period of life; however, as we will see below, their choices with respect to environmental
conditions do not affect the current environment so that the results hold unchanged.
Utility derived from the second period of life is discounted by a factor pi it ∈ (0, 1] which
accounts for life expectancy.4 Since only environmental quality is discounted, life expectancy
can also be regarded as the weight given by agents to main environmental concerns so that, it
could be interpreted as the level of green preferences. It is worth noticing that here, the discount
factor is endogenous as we consider that life expectancy of an individual i crucially depends
on educational choices. More specifically, we argue that longevity is widely explained by the
level of education (without focusing on the feedback effect of life expectancy on education
investment itself): More educated agents adopt healthier behaviours, have more information
about risks, etc...Because education and income are positively linked, more educated agents,
who often exhibit higher income, may also have better access to health services, adequate living
conditions, etc. (see, for instance, Barro & Sala-i Martin (1995), Chakraborty (2004), de la Croix
& Licandro (2007) or Lleras-Muney (2005)).
2.1.1 Education
During the first period of life, each agent is endowed with one unit of time, which can be
shared among education and work. All individuals spend a fixed period of time at school,
λ ∈ (0, 1), in order to acquire basic skills. Once they get this primary knowledge, they can
directly supply unskilled labour to the market. However, they may become skilled, through
acquisition of additional human capital. Since individuals rather than their parents decide
about their education, the choice of acquiring human capital implies a trade-off: human capital
allows for a higher wage while it requires a loss in the valuable time, z. Let us suppose that this
time cost is distributed uniformly within the population on the range [0, 1]. As in Cervellati
& Sunde (2005), this parameter z may be interpreted as innate abilities in terms of learning
capacities. However, in our model, individual abilities affect the cost of education rather than
its return. Consequently, a high z (equivalent to lower abilities) implies that the time spent
4. Throughout the paper, we interchangeably use the terms "life expectancy" and "longevity" since both concepts
exhibit similar properties. It can be either a probability of surviving to old age or the length of the second period of
life, thus being included in the interval (0, 1]. In either case, the benefit drawn from the environment is discounted
by a time-length factor.
7
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.42
educating is longer and the remaining time working on the market, shorter. Then, the labour
income (yit) for both types of existing workers, during the first period of life, is given by:{
yst = (1− λ− z)w
s
t
yut = (1− λ)w
u
t ,
(2)
where i = {s, u}, for skilled workers and unskilled ones, respectively. If two types of workers
co-exist within the population, we can also define two distinct levels of life expectancy corre-
sponding to educational choices. Therefore, we denote pi i, the life expectancy of a worker i,
where 0 < piu < pi s ≤ 1, according to empirical evidence mentioned in the Introduction.
2.1.2 Environmental quality
Agents use their labour income to consume and are subjected to a poll tax (τt > 0).5 Since envi-
ronmental quality is mostly a public good and costs required to abate pollution are very high,
individuals or groups within the population are unable to effectively provide them. Then, we
assume that this tax is levied by the government in order to alleviate pollution, to improve or,
at least, to preserve environmental quality. Accordingly, in our framework, we consider a po-
litical equilibrium where agents take an active part in the decision-making process concerning
the design of the environmental policy by voting on the level of such a tax. Consequently, the
effective tax which is implemented will depend on the distribution of skills among the popula-
tion.
Finally, all decisions are taken during the first period of life and the budget constraint writes
as:
yit − τt = c
i
t (3)
This tax considerably affects the evolution of environmental quality over time. In fact, in line
with the seminal work of John & Pecchenino (1994), we express the law of motion of environ-
mental quality as:
Et+1 = Et − Pt + g(τt) (4)
where Pt, harmful pollution flows, g(τt), the environmental maintenance provided by the au-
thorities. Let us underline that, here, agents value the environment that may encompass envi-
ronmental conditions (going from air quality to quality of water, soils etc.) as well as resources
availability (like, for instance, biodiversity, forestry, fisheries and so on..). Broadly speaking,
this variable Et ≥ 0 is multidimensional and can be regarded as an indicator of all amenities
provided by nature.
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that in our set-up, maintenance outcome (as well as pol-
lution flows) account only for the next period so that adults’ choices with respect to the envi-
ronment can not directly affect current environmental conditions. Indeed, the natural environ-
ment and most kinds of ecosystems react slowly to pollution flows or environmental measures
so that environmental changes are postponed and often occur after a long period.
5. Of course, it could be the case that the tax is proportional to the wage; however, as we will see later, in that case,
the choice regarding extra education would depend on both expectations with respect to future environmental qual-
ity, but also predictions about the future tax rate. Moreover, the preferred tax rate it-self would depend on wages,
and so would be distributed within the population of educated agents. Finally, this would heavily complicate the
analysis and leaves no room for strategic behviours.
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2.1.3 Production
In the end, one good is produced (and privately consumed) thanks to labour. Both kinds of
workforce are perfectly substitute, so that:
Yt = A
sHt + A
uLt, (5)
where Ht represents the aggregate skilledworkforce (so called human capital) and Lt the aggre-
gate unskilled labour available in the economy. 6 Then, Ai stands for the productivity level of
each labour force. We assume that As > Au since we want to capture the greater capacity of ed-
ucated agents to adopt and apply a given technology, to learn additional knowledge: it is less
"costly" to adapt to advanced technologies being already educated (for further discussion see,
among others, Fershtman et al. (1996), Caselli (1999), Galor & Moav (2000)). Finally, for ease of
presentation, we assume constant productivity and do not consider any growth process.
Besides, so as the market is competitive and labour forces exhibit constant returns to scale,
each input is paid to its marginal productivity. Therefore, a skill premium for educatedworkers
exists, which involves a positive wage gap between both kinds of occupations. From (5), wage
rates are deduced: {
ws = As
wu = Au
(6)
Finally, we consider that pollution flows in the economy arise from the production process
such that:
Pt = βYt , (7)
with 0 < (1 − β) ≤ 1, which reveals the cleanness degree of production.7 The higher β, the
dirtier the production. Here, we neglect the fact that pollution intensity may differ from one
kind of labour to an other, like Ikefuji & Horii (2007) do, but we consider a whole production-
induced pollution. In this respect, it could be quite similar to assume that pollution is associ-
ated with consumption flows in the economy. We could have considered that unskilled labour
was more polluting, similar to Ikefuji & Horii (2007). We would have then endogeneized the
parameter β, so that it evolves positively with the share of unskilledworkforce within the econ-
omy: β( LH ) and β
′(·) > 0. In that case, our results would have been reinforced. Indeed, a
large proportion of unskilled workers would induce a heavier pressure on the environment as
well as a lower level of environmental protection: the deterioration of the environment would
doubtless accelerate.
2.2 Microeconomic choices
In this section, we present the microeconomic behaviours of agents. On the one hand, we
show that educational choices hinge on utilities comparison; on the other hand, the effort of
maintenance is derived from a simple majority voting mechanism. Then, using the dynamic
complementarity between choices of education and the demand for environmental protection
allows us to study the global dynamics of the environment in Section 3.
6. This perfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled types of labour is very restrictive and may be dis-
cussed. However, allowing for the complementarity would heavily complicate the model, although the reasoning
with respect to the choices of education is preserved.
7.We consider here a linear relationship between pollution flows and production for the sake of simplicity.
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In order to clearly present our analysis, we consider a specific timing during the first pe-
riod of life: at first, agents choose whether to educate or not, and in a second step, they vote,
according to their skills, on the level of the tax.
2.2.1 Educational choices
An individual i with a time cost equal to z is indifferent between educate himself or not, if, for
a given tax,
Ust = U
u
t ⇔ [(1− λ− z)w
s − τt] + pi
sEt+1 = [(1− λ)w
u − τt] + pi
uEt+1 (8)
Using (6), a threshold value on z, is deduced from the above equality:
z˜t =
(1− λ)(As − Au) + [pi s − piu]Eat+1
As
≡ z˜(Eat+1), (9)
with Eat+1, the expected future state of the environment. Since agents derive utility from the
environment during their second period of life, they have to anticipate future environmental
conditions when they decide about their additional education. The uncertainty that leads agent
to form expectations with regards to the environment, lies in the fact that choices of education
will have an impact on both the effort of maintenance and the pollution flows. The static
comparison of utility (see equation (8)) implies that for any distributed z ≤ z˜(Eat+1), agents
choose to acquire additional knowledge; conversely, if z > z˜(Eat+1), individuals do not invest
in further education and provide unskilled labour force. Obviously, if z˜(Eat+1) is very high that is
for Eat+1 ≥ Eˆ ≡
λ(As−Au)+Au
[pi s−piu]
, everybody educates (i.e. the proportion of highly educated agents
equals unity); the production is only ensured thanks to type-s workers. When Eat+1 = 0, there
is still a positive share of agents that spend time educating, z˜(Eat+1) =
(1−λ)(As−Au)
As
8.
Not surprisingly, this threshold value z˜(Eat+1) depends on two main factors. The first one,
quite usual, is the income effect: a rise in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled activities
spurs the extra investment in human capital, while λ, the fixed cost of primary education tends
to discourage it. The second factor is represented by agents’ expectations regarding the future
state of the environment. Individuals are prone to suffer a higher cost of education if they an-
ticipate improved future environmental conditions. In fact, an expected good environmental
quality fosters education, because, in that case, agents hope to benefit longer from the environ-
ment when old. This positive effect holds all the more so as the longevity gap is large between
the two types of workforce. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between z˜(Eat+1) and the future
state of the environment.
Finally, let us notice that the global impact of the skilled workers’ productivity (As) is not
clear cut. In particular, despite the positive income effect, it turns out that education is costly,
with zAs measuring the individual cost of acquiring human capital (see equation (2)). Yet, when
agents educate they receive a fixed gain derived from the environment, altered by a longevity
effect. Then, the relative gain of being skilled ([pi s − piu]Eat+1/As) falls with A
s. In fact, the net
utility derived from the environment is cut down by the global cost of education.
8.More specifically, it becomes impossible to solve the model in an analytical way. For instance, considering a
Cobb-Douglas production function (such that the two types of labour are complement) would prevent from com-
puting a threshold value on z. Nevertheless, using such production function, we are able to state that there exists a
unique value of z, which also depends positively on expectations with respect to environmental quality and which
determines when agents decide to invest in human capital or not. (see Appendix F)
10
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z˜(Ea
t+1)
Ea
t+1Eˆ
(1−λ)(As−Au)
As
A
s(2λ−1)+Au(1−λ)
2[pis−piu]
1/2
Figure 3: share of skilled agents within the population
Provided that z is uniformly distributed within the population, the aggregate labour sup-
plies of both types of workers, at date t, are given by:
Ht =
∫ z˜t
0
dz = z˜(Eat+1) (10)
and
Lt =
∫ 1
z˜t
dz = (1− z˜(Eat+1)) (11)
Here, z˜(Eat+1) is exactly the proportion within the population that does educate.
Furthermore, using equations (10) and (11), the production in the economy can be rewritten
as:
Yt =
{
z˜(Eat+1)(A
s − Au) + Au if 0 < Eat+1 < Eˆ
As if Eat+1 ≥ Eˆ
(12)
When all workers are skilled, the production is fully determined by the productivity level of
highly educated workers; when both types of workers co-exist, the share of skilled individuals
in the economy boosts production.
In the end, using equation (7) and (12), it follows that pollution flows in the economy (Pt)
may be expressed as:
P(Eat+1) =
{
β[z˜(Eat+1)(A
s − Au) + Au] if 0 < Eat+1 < Eˆ
βAs if Eat+1 ≥ Eˆ
(13)
Since a rise in the proportion of highly educated workers stimulates both production (12) and
pollution (13), a feedback effect of expectations on environmental quality arises: optimistic
predictions trigger extra investment in education, which in turn, by increasing the share of
skilled workers, induces more pollution and so more pressure on the environment. Finally, the
net impact of agents’ expectations on the evolution of the environment will crucially depend
on the effort of maintenance provided by the government and on the adopted tax within the
society.
11
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2.2.2 Political equilibrium
As mentioned before, the poll tax is exclusively used to provide environmental maintenance
expenditure (this could also be a direct reduction of pollution). The government’s budget is
balanced, so that:
z˜tτt + (1− z˜t)τt = τt, (14)
the sum of the contributions finances the global effort of maintenance. The environmental
protection provided by the authorities writes as:
g(τt) = τ
θ
t , (15)
with θ ∈ (0, 1], which could embody the efficiency of the maintenance technology (cf. Ballestra
& Dottori (2009)). Here, tax revenue translates into maintenance, but we consider that this
maintenance technology exhibits decreasing marginal returns: as tax receipts rise, the marginal
efficiency of abatement reduces. It is more easy to abate pollution at the beginning of the
cleaning process, but as the receipt grows, it becomes more tricky. Alternatively, this parameter
θ could be regarded as the efficiency of government institutions, meaning that a low value of θ
induces a larger wasted part of tax receipts. Tax revenue may be partly dissipated in collection
costs; otherwise said, marginal collection costs increase in the tax, due, for instance, to the
existence of bureaucratic inefficiencies (Saint Paul & Verdier (1997), Lightart & Ploeg (1999)). In
the end, both interpretations of θ implies that utility is concave in environmental maintenance
and so satisfies usual properties: individuals face a trade-off between private consumption and
future environmental quality (consumption of a public good).
Once they have decided about their education, agents aim at maximising their lifetime util-
ity under equations (3), (4) and (15) in order to determine their optimal willingness-to-pay for
environmental preservation. From the First Order Condition (FOC), we obtain the optimal poll
tax for both types of workers in a decentralized equilibrium:
τ i = (pi iθ)
1
1−θ (16)
It is worth noticing that this optimal willingness-to-pay for the environment is constant over
time and is fully determined by the level of education through life expectancy, which might
differ according to the type of agent. Provided that pi s > piu, it follows obviously that τ s > τu.
Hence, high-income agents are more prone to pay for environmental protection.
Our result is thus consistent with widespread empirical evidence such that higher income
or/and higher level of education raise stronger concern for the environment (Goetz et al. (1998),
Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman (2000), Brock & Taylor (2005)). To some extent, this result may
also be related to a theoretical literature that adresses the determinants of green consciousness,
relying on the evolution of agents’ income.
Finally, because theweight paid to environmental quality depends on agents’ life expectancy,
agents are merely capable of contributing more if they expect to benefit longer from the envi-
ronment, and conversely. As in Mariani et al. (2010), life expectancy becomes a major determi-
nant of environmental performance.
In the end, such kind ofmicroeconomic behaviours shape environmental quality at amacroe-
conomic level. Indeed, as individuals exhibit single-peaked preferences with respect to the en-
vironment, the theorem of the median voter holds. Therefore, the political outcome depends
12
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on the median voter’s feature, be it skilled or unskilled, and writes as:{
τ = τu if Eat+1 < E˜
τ = τ s if Eat+1 ≥ E˜
(17)
with
E˜ ≡
As(2λ− 1) + 2Au(1− λ)
2[pi s − piu]
, (18)
where E˜ is defined as the level of Eat+1 such that z˜(E
a
t+1) = 1/2.
The poll tax effectively chosen is determined by agents’ expectations with respect to en-
vironmental quality. If Eat+1 is low, less agents invest in education and the share of unskilled
workers is greater than half (z˜(Eat+1) < 1/2). Consequently, the effort of environmental preser-
vation provided in the economy is mitigated. The opposite is true if Eat+1 is high. Agents are
prone to suffer a higher extra cost of education: the share of skilled workers rises, the median
voter becomes skilled (z˜(Eat+1) ≥ 1/2).
9 Accordingly, the demand for environmental protection
raises so as the tax.
3 Dynamics
Substituting (7)-(17) into the law of motion of environmental quality, we obtain a system that
describes the global dynamical behaviour of our economy. Depending on the median voter’s
feature, we can characterize the dynamics of the economy. In particular, when themedian voter
is unskilled, we define Et+1 ≡ ψu(Et, E
a
t+1) so that
ψu(Et, E
a
t+1) = Et − P(E
a
t+1) + τ
uθ , (19)
with P(Eat+1) defined in (7). Pollution flows may vary according to E
a
t+1, since the expected
value of the environment influence the proportion of skilled workers within the economy and
therefore the pollution level. Alternatively, when the median voter is skilled, we define Et+1 ≡
ψs(Et, Eat+1) such that
ψs(Et, E
a
t+1) =
{
Et − P(Eat+1) + τ
sθ if Eat+1 < Eˆ
Et −βAs + τ s
θ
if Eat+1 ≥ Eˆ.
(20)
Finally, the global dynamics can be summarized by:
Et+1 =
{
ψu(Et, Eat+1) if E
a
t+1 < E˜
ψs(Et, Eat+1) if E
a
t+1 ≥ E˜
(21)
The dynamics are dramatically influenced by expectations agents have about the future en-
vironment. These anticipations determine the share of skilled workers within the population
and accordingly the type of the median voter. Hence, the evolution of environmental qual-
ity over time relies on individuals anticipations. Using equation (21), we can argue that the
9.Notice that here, there exists a usual problemwhen z˜(Eat+1) = 1/2 to determinewhich groupwins the elections.
In order to avoid this, and for the sake of simplicity, we simply assume that when z˜(Eat+1) = 1/2, the winner
majority is skilled.
13
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median voter is skilled only for fairly high values of Eat+1. If initially agents anticipate good fu-
ture environmental conditions, they choose to educate, since they expect to benefit longer from
the environment. As the proportion of type-s workers increases, the median voter is likely to
be skilled. Consequently, the government implements a heavier tax and receipts devoted to
environmental preservation are larger. Symmetric reasoning could apply when dealing with
pessimistic expectations, that is when Eat+1 < E˜.
However, even if the effect of the tax is clear cut, the distribution of skills within the popu-
lation might display ambiguous effects. Because pollution flows grow with the share of highly
educated workers, agents’ expectations may translate into more pressure on the environment
(see equation (7)). Yet, those anticipations become beneficial to environmental quality, only
through a "cliquet" effect, that is when the economy shifts from one regime to another. In that
case, optimistic predictions also imply a larger effort of maintenance, so that environmental
quality improves.
3.1 Perfect foresight dynamics
In order to solve the dynamics, we assume that agents perfectly anticipate future environmen-
tal conditions, thus Eat+1 = Et+1. Under this assumption, the perfect foresight dynamics of the
economy is obtained by solving the system (21) for Eat+1 = Et+1. Hence, a one-dimensional
dynamical system describes the evolution of environmental quality over time:
Et+1 =
{
Ψu(Et) if Et+1 < E˜
Ψs(Et) if Et+1 ≥ E˜,
(22)
with:
Ψu(Et) =
As[Et + τu
θ
]−β(1− λ)(As − Au)2 −βAuAs
As +β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
(23)
and
Ψs(Et) =


As[Et+τ s
θ
]−β(1−λ)(As−Au)2−βAuAs
As+β(As−Au)(pi s−piu) if Et+1 < Eˆ
Et −βAs + τ s
θ
if Et+1 ≥ Eˆ
(24)
The global perfect foresight dynamics (equation (22)) are in two parts differing by the median
voter’s feature. We start by analyzing separately the two trajectories and then we study the
global dynamics.
More specifically we can prove that each part of the dynamics, Ψu(Et) or Ψs(Et), taken
separately, admits only one globally stable steady-state, Eu and Es, characterized by a low and
a high environmental quality, respectively (see Appendix A). Here, a steady-state is defined as
a fixed point Ei with i = {s, u} such that: Ψi(Et) = Et. In particular, using equations (23) and
(24), for 0 < Et+1 < Eˆ, we will have that:
Eu =
Asτu
θ
−β[(1− λ)(As − Au)2 − AsAu]
β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
(25)
Es =
Asτ s
θ
−β[(1− λ)(As − Au)2 − AsAu]
β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
, (26)
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where Es > Eu, since τ s > τu. The sole difference between the two stationary values stands in
the level of the tax.10
Given these properties, let us now study the global dynamics of the economy. In particular,
it is described by the trajectory Ψu(Et) if the expected environmental quality is damaged, while
it is characterized by Ψs(Et), if expectations are much more optimistic. Here, we assume that
when two trajectories exist in t+ 1, the economy follows the one prevailing at date t. Hereafter,
this property refers to the concept of stationary expectations.11 In order to describe clearly the
global dynamics, we also define the threshold values on environmental quality that determine
the area of existence of each trajectory. We denote by E, the value of E such that Ψu(E) = E˜:
beyond E, Ψu(Et) does not exist anymore, or otherwise said, the majority is no longer unskilled.
Similarly, we define E such that Ψs(E) = E˜. Since, in turn, the median voter’s feature depends
on expected future environmental conditions, we can claim that:
Proposition 1 Let assume that agents have perfect foresight expectations, then
(i) Et always converges towards E
u, if E > Es;
(ii) Et always converges towards E
s, if E < Eu;
(iii) when E < Eu < Es < E, there always exist stationary expectations such that:
• if E0 < E˜, Et+1 = Ψu(Et) and Et converges towards E
u
• if E0 ≥ E˜, Et+1 = Ψs(Et) and Et converges towards E
s
Proof. See Appendix B
Part (i) of Proposition 1 is likely to arise when the value of E˜ is very high, thus implying
that the majority may hardly be skilled. For instance, if primary education is already very costly,
agents will have less incentives to invest in further education. Similarly, a very dirty production
technology might prevent the high equilibrium to exist. In that case, no matter initial condi-
tions, the economy converges towards the low, unique and globally stable equilibrium, Eu.
Conversely, part (ii)might occur if the longevity gap is large. A high efficiency degree of main-
tenance expenditure compared to β may also favour the achievement of the high equilibrium,
Es.
Part (iii) of Proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 4. When the two steady-states co-exist, then,
depending on initial conditions, the economymay converge towards either Eu or Es. If initially,
environmental quality is somewhat low (for E0 < E˜), majority is unskilled so as the median
voter. Under the assumption of stationary expectations, anticipations are and remain quite
pessimistic and incentives to educate drop. Then, the public effort of maintenance is lower
and the economy converges towards Eu, following the trajectory described by the function
Ψu(Et). The resulting stationary value of environmental quality is low and the share of un-
skilled workers within the population is large. In that case, we can say the economy is caught
in an environmental trap featured by a damaged environmental quality and a low level of de-
velopment. Conversely, if initially the environment is clean (for E0 ≥ E˜), the median voter is
10. It is worth noticing that for Et+1 ≥ Eˆ, E
s = τ
sθ−βAs
η . However, we choose to report in the text the solutions
depicted in Figure 4.
11. This assumption is made for ease of presentation and in order to give the main insights of the model. It will be
relaxed in Subsection 3.2, where we present a more general case.
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Figure 4: Multiple equilibria, case (iii) of Proposition 1
skilled. Stationary expectations are optimistic and incentives to invest in extra education are
boosted. The level of maintenance provided publicly is higher and the economy reaches Es,
a stationary value characterized by improved environmental conditions and a more educated
population. Notice that in our setup, an increase in the proportion of skilled workers does not
imply necessarily a heavier pressure on the environment. In fact, it also induces a rise in the
environmental maintenance provided by the public authorities. Yet, as discussed above, this
latter effect overcomes the former and so environmental quality at the high steady-state is well
improved compared to the trap.
In our framework, the presence of multiple equilibria directly stems from the complemen-
tarity between incentives to invest in human capital and the willingness-to-pay for environ-
mental protection, through the longevity effect. These multiple equilibria, linking environ-
mental quality and level of education, can be backed up by some empirical evidence, which
show that more educated economies are likely to exhibit better environmental conditions (see,
for instance, Magnani (2000), Bimonte (2002), Fredriksson et al. (2005), Farzin & Bond (2006)).
As shown previously, this positive relationship may be micro-founded. In particular, a higher
level of education may in it-self trigger stronger concern for the environment (Goetz et al.
(1998), Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman (2000), Brock & Taylor (2005)), thus encouraging the
emergence of a green consciousness. At an aggregate level, this green concern of skilled indi-
viduals has more chance to translate into improved environmental quality through the greater
ability of educated agents to influence political decisions via, for instance, lobbying groups,
non-governmental organizations, ecological political groups, etc....
3.2 Indeterminacy and self-fulfilling equilibria
In this section, we relax the assumption of stationary expectations. In particular, we show that
expectations might be self-fulfilling and might determine the long-run political outcome. In
fact, there exist some values of Et such that Et+1 is undetermined. Then, as in Bisin & Verdier
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(2000) or Hauk & Saez-Marti (2002), we focus on the case where the two stationary values of
the environment belong to this indeterminacy area; finally, we study the dynamic implications
of agents’ coordination on a particular outcome regarding future environmental quality. We
can then state that:
Proposition 2 Expectations might be self-fulfilling since two different values of Et+1 are compatible
with a unique value of Et, ∀Et ∈ [E, E].
Proof. See Appendix C
Interestingly, our model exhibits self-fulfilling expectations as claimed in Proposition 2.
This implies that when, initially, the distribution of abilities within population is relatively
balanced, the role of anticipations and their coordination on a particular issue become a key
ingredient for the determination of long-run environmental evolutions.
Consider, for instance, a situation where initially agents of type-u are a majority and Et ∈
[E, E]. If all of them are pessimistic and thus expecting that future environmental quality will
remain damaged, the share of unskilled workers remains majority. The resulting effort of main-
tenance is thus small and self-confirms initial predictions. Consequently, if agents coordinate
on this same pessimistic belief all along the dynamical process, the environment converges to-
wards Eu. Conversely, starting from the same situation, that is a majority of unskilled workers
within the population but if agents coordinate on a more optimistic anticipation, the stationary
value of environmental quality may be improved. In fact, agents are more likely to invest in ad-
ditional education for them-selves: type-s workers may become a majority and the tax equals
τ s, thus increasing mechanically the effort of maintenance. Again, expectations are realised
while environmental quality reached by the economy is better. Moreover, unskilled workers
turn out to be minority.
Proposition 1 states that the stationary values of the environment are stable under stationary
expectations while Proposition 2 defines an indeterminacy area, in which expectations may be
self-confirmed. Then, it turns out that these stationary values may be destabilized following a
change in expectations. The Corollary below summarizes this result:
Corollary 1 When Es and Eu ∈ [E, E], one economy that would have converged towards one of both
equilibria under the assumption of stationary expectations, might rather reach the other steady-state
thanks to a change in expectations.
In the configuration depicted in Figure 4, the low equilibrium Eu belongs to the indeterminacy
area [E; E]. Consequently, one economy initially trapped in Eu might jump onto the optimistic
trajectory Ψs(Et) and converge towards Es by means of change in expectations. In this case,
switching from pessimistic anticipations to more optimistic ones allows the economy to escape
from the initial poor-environment trap. Notice that this mechanism works also in the opposite
way, so that an economy initially located in Es might, in the end, be pushed towards the low
equilibrium, if anticipations become suddenly pessimistic.
In our setting, changes in agents’ expectations is a possible way, among others, to switch
the trajectories followed by one economy. As pointed out by some other theoretical papers like
Glomm&Ravikumar (1995), Bisin &Verdier (2000) orHauk& Saez-Marti (2002), thesemultiple
equilibria arise due to failures in the expectations coordination. Then, the implementation of
public policies or the authorities commitment might be a solution that enables to correct these
inefficiencies. Otherwise said, the success of any environmental policy, which aims at reducing
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environmental deterioration, could be realised, at least partially, if authorities are able to coor-
dinate agents’ beliefs on quite optimistic expectations with respect to the environment it-self.
However, it is worth noticing that here, the government can not commit it-self with respect to
the effort of maintenance since agents do decide on the prevailing level of maintenance pro-
vided publicly: the authorities can not announce any environmental policy in advance neither
shape the median voter’s ability. Expectations can not be influenced directly by the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, in order to select one specific equilibrium and to ensure the achievement
of its environmental goal, the government may choose to modify the cost of education. Indeed,
education is a crucial factor that influencing agents green preferences.
In the following section, we emphasize the role played by a public policy on the opportu-
nity of switching the equilibria. However, let us underline that, the selection of one specific
equilibrium is not a trivial choice. In fact, the welfare analysis leads to ambiguous results due
to the existence of heterogeneous agents: it is then tricky to rank both equilibria. On the one
hand, the high equilibrium Es always seems to be preferred by skilled workers: first, the imple-
mented tax is exactly the one they vote for; second, environmental quality is higher. However,
even if unskilled individuals benefit from a better environmental quality in Es, they have to pay
an undesirable and heavier tax τ s. Then, the high equilibriummight not be optimal for unskilled
workers. A governmental policy that would aim at reaching Es and escaping the trap, might
not be Pareto-optimal, if the taxation effect dominates the green benefits. Nonetheless, since
the level of development is also higher in Es, we will consider such an objective and assess the
instrument to achieve it.
4 Policy implications
As mentioned above, an improved environmental quality and a higher level of development
are reached, at the steady-state, if agents exhibit optimistic expectations, thus being more likely
to educate. Accordingly, in order to step out from the poor-environment trap, the government
may aim at encouraging agents to invest in additional human capital. Since the government is
not capable of coordinating agents’ beliefs, we consider stationary expectations and study the
opportunities of achieving a better environmental performance, starting from the low equilib-
rium Eu.
Consistently with our previous results, we consider, among the various available instru-
ments, that the government reduces the fixed cost of education (λ) in order to boost the share
of highly educated workers within the population. Here, as education is time consuming, the
decrease of λ includes all improvements made in order to ameliorate the "learning technology":
a better access to school, an increase in the size of teaching profession, more schools, and the
like.
The starting point in time of our analysis is date T and the economy is pinned-down to Eu,
the environmental trap such that Eu < E. From that moment, the government announces that
tax benefits are used for two alternative purposes: environmental maintenance and education.
More precisely, the authorities decide to devote a share α ∈ (0, 1) of public receipt to environ-
mental maintenance, while the remaining amount of tax (1−α) are invested in education.
Because of the timing in the decision process, at date T, the share of both skilled and unskilled
agents within the population is unaffected. Even if the educational public policy is announced,
unless the government contracts a debt, he can not fund the reduction in the fixed cost of edu-
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cation. As long as the public policy takes place, the government uses the receipts from the tax to
finance the "subsidy" to education. Every thing goes as if the "educational" side of the policy is
funded by the previous generation. This necessarily implies that the young generation at date
T only suffer from the "green" side of the public policy. Agents’ behaviour is instantaneously
altered when dealing with the optimal poll tax and therefore, the environmental quality law
of motion evolves from date T + 1. Let us underline that the public policy is still endogenous,
although agents do not vote on the distribution of the tax benefits among the two purposes:
they only choose the level of the tax, taken as given the share devoted to environmental efforts.
In order to assess the consequences of such kind of endogenous public policy, we first de-
scribe the changes that occur during the transition phase at date T; then, we expose the result-
ing dynamics of the economy when the policy is fully implemented, from date T + 1.
4.1 Transition phase
The governmental action has a direct effect on the future environmental quality, which enters
the utility function of agents born at date T. Differently from (4), environmental quality now
evolves according to:
ET+1 = ET − PT + (ατ
p)θ , (27)
where τ p is the implemented tax, noted with superscript p that stands for policy. Provided that
initially the economy is located in Eu, the value of PT is given.
Since the level of technology is given and constant over time, agents maximise (1), under
(2), (6) and (27) in order to determine the amended optimal poll tax. Notice that the design
of the policy (α) is taken as given when agents determine their optimal willingness-to-pay. It
yields for an individual of type-i:
τ p,i = (pi iθαθ)
1
1−θ . (28)
This result captures the positive and one-way relationship between the share of tax revenue
dedicated to environmental expenditure and the level of the tax: an increase in α fosters the
investment in environmental maintenance. Otherwise said, since extra education is not trig-
gered by any altruistic motive, a larger share of receipt devoted to education does not provide
any additional gain of utility, but only a smaller incentive to invest in maintenance. Finally,
compared to the benchmark model (that is when α equals unity), for both types of agents, the
willingness-to-pay for improving environmental conditions is smaller, sinceα < 1.
Under the assumption of stationary expectations, and because we only consider Eu as a
starting point of the analysis, the dynamics are described by the following equation:
ET+1 = Ωu(ET) (29)
where Ωu(ET) is the "transitional" value of environmental quality. In fact, this dynamics is
slightly amended compared to the benchmark model. Formally, using (9), (7), (27) and (28), it
yields for 0 < ET+1 < E˜:
Ωu(ET) =
As[ET + (ατ
p,u)θ]−β(1− λ)(As − Au)2 −βAuAs
As +β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
(30)
The economy jumps from Eu onto Ωu(ET). During this period, date T, the majority is
unskilled and the environmental quality evolves taking into account the new willingness-to-
pay. At next date, we can state that:
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Lemma 1 Starting from Eu, if the government implements public education expenditure at date T,
environmental quality deteriorates at date T + 1.
Proof. The slope ofΩu(ET) is identical to the one of Ψu(Et), ∀ Et and t = 0, ..T..+ ∞. However,
Ωu(0) < Ψu(0). Thus,Ωu(ET) crosses the 45
◦ line before Eu.
Et+1
Et
E˜
E
t+
1
=
E
t
Ψu(Et)
Ψs(Et)
E
u
E
s
Ωu(ET )
E˘
Figure 5: First phase of transition
As depicted in Figure 5, starting from the low equilibrium Eu, at date T + 1, the economy
ends up in E˘(α), defined such that Ωu(Eu) = E˘(α). This level of environmental quality cru-
cially depends on the distribution of tax benefits. In fact, in the benchmark model, the whole
revenue collected by the government is devoted to environmental maintenance. As soon as the
public policy is implemented, the aggregate level of maintenance provided by the authorities
is reduced. Obviously, since pollution flows are constant, environmental quality deteriorates
compared to the initial situation. However, the larger the share granted to environmental pro-
tection, the less deteriorated the environment.
4.2 Long-run dynamics
Equation (27) describing the law of motion of the environment holds as soon as the public
policy is implemented. However, from now on, the generation born at date T + 1 benefits
from the subsidy to education (νt) and so the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers in the
economy might change.
4.2.1 Educational choices
Taking into account this fall into the cost of primary education, the budget constraint for both
types of agents is now given by the following system:{
ysT+1 = [1− (1−νT+1)λ− z]w
s
yuT+1 = [1− (1−νT+1)λ]w
u,
(31)
20
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.42
where νt ∈ [0, 1]. The government’s budget constraint is still balanced (see equation (14));
however a share (1−α) of these receipts are now devoted to education. The reduction in the
fixed cost of education is financed by the previous generation. Once the level of the tax has
been determined, the subsidy to education is deduced:
ν =
{
[(1−α)τ p,u]κ if ET < E˜
[(1−α)τ p,s]κ if ET ≥ E˜,
(32)
where κ ∈ [0, 1]. Consistently with the benchmark model, we consider that κ reveals the effi-
ciency of the learning technology: investing in schooling facilities exhibits decreasing marginal
returns, meaning that initial tax benefits are more productive. Moreover, this parameter could
capture the effectiveness of the tax collection, as previously. A higher value of κ would then
imply that tax revenue are slightly dissipated in collection costs.
The investment in education is still shaped by the comparison of indirect utilities but now,
using (1), (6) and (31), the threshold value on the private cost of education, z, writes as:
z˜
p
T+1 =
(As − Au)[1− (1−ν)λ] + (pi s − piu)EaT+2
As
≡ z˜p(EaT+2) (33)
Obviously, the positive effect of optimistic agents’ expectations is preserved; in addition, the
higher the subsidy, the greater the threshold education cost. This implies mechanically that
agents with a higher individual education cost, who would have been unskilled in the basic
model, may now invest in extra education. As previously, z˜p(EaT+2) accounts for the share of
skilled workers within the economy, so that if EaT+2 ≥ Eˆ
p ≡ A
u−(As−Au)λ(1−ν)
(pi s−piu)
, z˜p(EaT+2) equals
unity. As we focus on a specific configuration, that is Eu as starting point, we can directly
deduce the value of ν and the resulting threshold value on z˜p(EaT+2). Indeed, at the previous
date the majority was still unskilled, and so the poll tax was equal to τ p,u.12
This threshold value depends ambiguously on the parameterα, which captures the design
of the policy. Let us recall that individuals care about the environment so that α positively
influences agents willingness-to-pay for environmental protection. Then, on the one side, a
higher value of α involves larger tax receipts, which may, in turn, trigger the investment in
additional education and increase the share of skilled agents in the economy. On the other side,
this also implies a smaller share of tax benefits dedicated to education, and soα also influences
the decision of extra investment, but in the opposite way.
4.2.2 Political outcome
Similarly to our benchmark model and in order to determine their own optimal poll tax, agents
maximise their utility (1), under (27) and (31). Solving this program yields the result already
exposed in equation (28). Then, anticipations with respect to future environmental quality
shape the long-run dynamics of the model. To determine which tax prevails in the economy,
we proceed as in subsection 2.2.2. Hence, we can state that:{
τ = τ p,u if EaT+2 < E˜
p(α)
τ = τ p,s if EaT+2 ≥ E˜
p(α)
(34)
12.Notice that now the threshold value on z at date T + 1 may take two different values according to the tax
prevailing at date T. As we focus on a specific case, we do not present the alternative value of z˜p(EaT+2) when the
tax equals τ p,s at date T.
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where
E˜p(α) ≡
As − 2(As − Au)[1− (1− [(1−α)τ p,u]κ)λ]
2(pi s − piu)
(35)
Notice that E˜p(α) ≤ E˜. The central point here is that, as shown by the following derivative, the
threshold E˜p(α) depends, in a non-monotonic way, onα:
∂E˜p(α)
∂α =
(α −θ)κλ(As − Au)[(1−α)τ p,u]κ
(1−α)(1−θ)α(pi s − piu)
(36)
In particular, the impact of α is twofold such that E˜p(α) is described by a U-shape, according
to the values ofα. Starting from large values ofα, a fall in the parameter induces high returns
on the educational public policy. Incentives to invest in human capital rise, and predictions
have to be slightly optimistic to ensure a majority of skilled workers. As soon as α is small
enough, then receipts reduces sharply. For very low values of the parameter, tax receipts are
small, while the return on the environmental effort is very high. Agents have less incentives to
educate, expectations have to be very optimistic (i.e., EaT+2 very high) to allow the majority to
become skilled.
Since the goal pursued by the government is to step out from the trap, the threshold value
E˜p(α) should be as small as possible: this would ensure a skilled majority. Yet, this threshold
is U-shaped following changes in α. Then, there might exist a range of intermediate values
of the parameter α, such that E˜p(α) is small enough and allows optimistic expectations to be
self-confirmed. Therefore, this paves the way for an eventual optimal allocation of the public
receipt among education and environmental maintenance.
Once again, starting from date T + 1 and depending on the median voter’s feature, we
are able to characterize the dynamics of the economy. When the median voter is unskilled, we
define ET+2 ≡ φu(ET+1, E
a
T+2) and formally, using (7), (27) and (34), we obtain:
φu(ET+1, E
a
T+2) = ET+1− P(E
a
T+2) + (ατ
p,u)θ . (37)
When the median voter is highly educated, we have ET+2 ≡ φs(ET+1, E
a
T+2) such that
φs(ET+1, E
a
T+2) =
{
ET+1− P(E
a
T+2) + (ατ
p,s)θ if EaT+2 < Eˆ
p
ET+1−βA
s + (ατ p,s)θ if EaT+2 ≥ Eˆ
p.
(38)
Finally, the global dynamics can be summarized by the following system:
ET+2 =
{
φu(ET+1, E
a
T+2) if E
a
T+2 < E˜
p(α)
φs(ET+1, E
a
T+2) if E
a
T+2 ≥ E˜
p(α)
(39)
As before, we consider rational expectations implying that EaT+2 = ET+2. Then, we can charac-
terize a perfect foresight dynamics by solving (37) and (38), for EaT+2 = ET+2. This assumption
allows us to obtain a one dimensional dynamical system that describes the evolution of envi-
ronmental quality from date T + 1 (see Appendix D):
ET+2 =
{
Φu(ET+1) if ET+2 < E˜
p(α)
Φs(ET+1) if ET+2 ≥ E˜
p(α)
(40)
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Similarly to the benchmark model, we can claim that, under proper conditions, each dynamic
trajectory, Φu(ET) or Φs(ET) taken separately, admits only one globally stable steady-state,
Ep,u and Ep,s, characterized by a low and a high environmental quality, respectively. Moreover,
when Et belongs to the interval [E
p, E
p
], there exists an area of indeterminacy: in that case,
expectations might be self-fulfilling.13
In particular, we have:
Ep,u =
As(ατ p,u)θ −βAsAu −β(As − Au)2[1− (1− [(1−α)τ p,u]κ)λ]
β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
(41)
and
Ep,s =
As(ατ p,s)θ −βAsAu −β(As − Au)2[1− (1− [(1−α)τ p,s]κ ])λ]
β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
(42)
Notice that Ep,u < Eu and Ep,s < Es, since τ i
θ
> (ατ p,i)θ. Introducing this public policy
that aims at stimulating investment in additional education lowers the stationary values of
environmental quality. However, this kind of public policy may become very useful, under
specific parameter configuration, when the objective of the government is to escape from the
low equilibrium, Eu.
4.3 Out of the trap
Let us remind that when α = 1, then E
p
= E and Eu = E˘. Yet, starting from a situation where
E > Eu and the economy is stuck in the environmental trap, the objective of this section is
to determine the parametric conditions on α, such that the economy escape from the trap. A
sufficient condition to achieve this goal is written as: ET+2 = E˘(α) > E
p
(α). Indeed, in that
case, at date T+ 2, themajority of workers chooses to invest in human capital and the economy
converges towards the high equilibrium Ep,s. In other words, the majority can only be skilled
and somore prone to engagemaintenance expenditure. The parameterα seems to be a relevant
and available instrument to achieve this target: the share of public receipt devoted to environ-
mental maintenance, and consequently to education, plays a crucial role by determining the
median voter’s feature.
Depending on the situation at date T + 1, we can claim that, as shown in Figure 6:
Proposition 3 Starting from Eu and under proper conditions, there exist two thresholds α1 and α2
with 0 < α1 < α2 < 1, such that for α ∈ [α1,α2], E
p
(α) < E˘(α). Then, the economy jumps onto the
optimistic trajectory described by Φs(ET+1) and, in the long-run, reaches the high equilibrium, E
p,s.
Proof. See Appendix E
There exists a set of values of α, in particular for α ∈ [α1,α2], so that the economy jumps
onto the optimistic trajectory, which is unique. Therefore, the economy may attain, in the long-
run, the stable stationary value Ep,s. Indeed, starting from Eu, at date T, environmental quality
deteriorates and the economy ends up in E˘(α), since incentives to expand in environmental
protection drop. Then, from T + 1, the public policy affects agents’ educational choices; a new
dynamics arise. For intermediary values of α, E
p
(α) sharply falls while incentives to invest
in education are boosted. In particular, if α ∈ [α1,α2], E˘(α) does no longer belong to the
13. The two threshold values are defined respectively such as: Φs(Ep) = E˜p(α) and Φu(E
p
) = E˜p(α).
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E
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Figure 6: Policy
indeterminacy area. As depicted in Figure 6, from date T + 2, the economy follows directly the
trajectory ofΦs(ET+1). In that case, the majority within the population is skilled and so exhibits
a higher willingness-to-pay. The public policy succeeds in coordinating agents’ expectations
and the economy escapes from the trap. Let us now study in detail under which conditions on
the design of the public policy, this configuration may occur.
The opportunity of switching from the pessimistic trajectory to the optimistic one relies on
the comparison between E˘(α), that is the situation of the economy at date T + 1, and E
p
(α).
In particular, if E˘(α) > E
p
(α), the majority of workers within the population is skilled at date
T + 2 and environmental quality evolves according to the optimistic trajectory, Φs(ET+1). In-
deed, similarly to the threshold value E˜p(α), the relationship between E
p
(α) andα is U-shaped.
Moreover, E˘(α) is monotonously increasing in the parameterα. Figure 7 describes the situation
where the two thresholdsα1 andα2 exist.
In the situation depicted in Figure 7, whenα = 1, the economy is trapped in the low equilib-
rium (E > Eu). Let us now consider that a share of the public receipts are devoted to education
(α < 1). As shown previously, the economy reaches E˘(α), characterized by a damaged en-
vironmental quality. This decrease in α, if small enough, also reduces E
p
(α) sharply, as the
public educational spending are very efficient. In the case where α ∈ [α1,α2], the later effect
dominates the former: investment in human capital is high enough to ensure a majority of
skilled workers. Finally, whenα becomes too small, public receipts diminish while educational
spending are less efficient. This implies that E
p
(α) goes up as E˘(α) is still decreasing.
Let us underline that from a strict environmental point of view, it could be in the interest of
the government to choose the highest value of α, among the range of available values, that is
α2. In fact, as soon as α ∈ [α1,α2], the economy is capable of escaping the trap, and converges
towards the higher stationary value of the environment, Es,p. However, this steady-state de-
pends positively on the parameter α, since it represents the share of public receipts devoted
to public environmental maintenance. Then, in order to reach the highest stationary value of
environmental quality, the authorities should implement a policy characterized byα2.
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Figure 7: Policy design
Even if the public policy is still endogenous, the authorities may intervene in order to stim-
ulate education. Starting from a low environmental quality, the economy may experience a
non-monotonous convergence towards the high equilibrium. Following the implementation of
the public policy, at first environmental quality deteriorates but then, if the policy design is bal-
anced, the environment may improve and the proportion of highly educated agents within the
society increases. However, as mentioned above, the stationary values of environmental qual-
ity when the policy is implemented are lower compared to the benchmark case, that is when
education is not "subsided". Therefore, it may be the interest of the government to implement
a temporary policy, in order to reach ultimately the highest equilibrium Es.
Corollary 2 Starting from Eu, a temporary public policy in favour of education may allow the economy
to achieve the highest steady-state Es > Ep,s, and so have long-lasting consequences.
Once the economy reaches the optimistic trajectory Φs(ET+1), then it seems possible to return
on the initial optimistic trajectory, described by Ψs(Et+1), in order to attain the highest equi-
librium, Es. In fact, it is optimal at some specific point in time to stop the public policy and
to devote all resources to environmental maintenance (α = 1). Obviously, the economy at-
tains a higher stationary value, since incentives to contribute for environmental maintenance
are stronger, and the share of highly educated agents is larger.
The main message of this kind of policy is that educating the population may be a mean
to improve in the long-run the overall situation, including environmental quality. The optimal
dynamic design of the policy evolves overtime: it is in the interest of the government to transfer
to education a share of resources initially devoted to environmental maintenance, and then, in
a second step to stop the educational spending in order to focus again on the environmental
issue. This kind of conclusion may be related with some experimental studies dealing with the
education, the information about environmental risks, or environmental protection. (see, for
instance, Jalan & Somanathan (2008))
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the interaction between the political and economic decisions of
agents. Agents decide whether to invest in additional human capital or not, according to their
expectations regarding future environmental quality. Two types of workers co-exist within the
population, some of them being skilled, the others unskilled. Once their occupational choices
are made, they vote for a poll tax that will be used to finance environmental protection and
the level of the effective implemented tax depends finally on the median voter’s feature. First,
under perfect foresight expectations, the model may provide multiplicity of equilibria. Then,
we show that agents’ expectations may be self-fulfilling when public policy is endogeneised:
for instance, if agents coordinate on optimistic expectations with regards to the future environ-
ment, they are likely to invest in additional education, display a higher willingness-to-pay for
environmental protection, and the economy reaches in the long-run, the higher equilibrium.
Finally, the level of education and environmental quality are positively correlated in the long-
run.
Our model also proposes to investigate the opportunities of a public intervention in order
to select a higher equilibrium. In this respect, we model the dynamic implications of education
expenditure. We show that under specific conditions on the design of the policy, reducing the
fixed cost of education may allow for reaching the high equilibrium.
Finally, as interesting extensions for further research, we would suggest (i) to explore alter-
native public policies suitable for the selection of one outcome (like public health for instance),
(ii) to introduce other policy options that would allow for coordinating agents’ expectations
and (iii) to enhance the realistic dimension of the model, by adding a growth process.
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A Appendix A
The dynamic system is described by equation (22) and explicitly by both (23) and (24). Let us
now determine the conditions of existence and stability of the steady-states, Eu and Es. Ψu(Et)
is increasing and piecewise linear in Et. The slope of the function belongs to the range [0, 1].
It follows that the solution of the equation Et = Ψu(Et) is unique and globally stable. We
denote this steady-state Eu. Hence, when Et > Ψu(Et) (<), environmental quality deteriorates
(improves).
Similarly, Ψs(Et) is increasing and piecewise linear in Et. The slope of the function belongs
to the range [0, 1]. It follows that the solution of the equation Et = Ψs(Et) is unique and globally
stable. We denote this steady-state Es. Hence, when Et > Ψs(Et) (<), environmental quality
deteriorates (improves).
B Proof of proposition 1
Let us determine under which conditions multiplicity may arise.
In order to determine the area of existence of each dynamics, we need to define two thresh-
old values on Et. First, Ψu(Et) exists for all Et+1 < E˜. Then, we define E such that Ψu(Et) = E˜.
It follows that:
E =
β(As + Au) + (Au − As)(1− 2λ) + Au − 2τu
θ
2(pi s − piu)
(B.1)
Then, Ψu exists for all Et < E. Similarly, Ψs(Et) exists for all Et+1 ≥ E˜. Then, we define E
such that Ψs(Et) = E˜. Using equation (B.1) and substituting τu by τ s yields the value of E.
Obviously, since τ s > τu, then E > E. Finally, Ψs exists for all Et > E.
(i) E > E > Es > Eu.
For Et > E, the unique perfect foresight is described by Ψs(Et). Since, for Et > Es, envi-
ronmental quality deteriorates, ultimately it becomes lower than E. For Et ∈ [E, E], there ex-
ist two trajectories compatible with perfect expectations: Et+1 = Ψu(Et) or Et+1 = Ψs(Et).
Since, Et > Es > Eu, environmental quality deteriorates, whatever the trajectory and be-
comes ultimately lower than E. For Et < E, the unique perfect foresight path is described
by Et+1 = Ψu(Et). Hence, the economy converges towards E
u.
(ii) Es > Eu > E > E.
For Et < E, the unique perfect foresight is described by Ψu(Et). Since, for Et < Eu, environ-
mental quality improves, ultimately it becomes larger than E. For Et ∈ [E, E], there exist two
trajectories compatible with perfect expectations: Et+1 = Ψu(Et) or Et+1 = Ψs(Et). Since, Et <
Es < Eu, environmental quality improves, whatever the trajectory and becomes ultimately
larger than E. For Et > E, the unique perfect foresight path is described by Et+1 = Ψs(Et).
Hence, the economy converges towards Es.
(iii)E > Es > Eu > E
For any E0 < E˜, Ψu(Et) describes the dynamics of the economy: the equilibrium reached is
Eu. Conversely, for any E0 ≥ E˜, the dynamics of the economy is described by Ψs(Et) and the
equilibrium attained is Es.
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C Proof of Proposition 2
Both Ψs(Et) and Ψu(Et) are monotonically increasing in Et. Hence, for Et ∈ [E, E], Ψs(Et) ≥
Ψs(E) = E˜ and Ψu(Et) ≤ Ψu(E) = E˜. Consequently, if agents expect that the median voter
will be skilled in t + 1: Et+1 = Ψu(Et) ≤ E˜ and the median voter is effectively skilled. In a
similar way, if agents expect that the median voter will be unskilled, Et+1 = Ψs(Et) ≥ E˜, and
expectations are then self-confirmed.
D Dynamic implications of the public policy
The dynamics are described by equation (40). Let us now determine the conditions of existence
and stability of the steady-states, Ep,u and Ep,s. Φu(ET+1) is increasing and piecewise linear
in ET. The slope of the function belongs to the range [0, 1]. It follows that the solution of
the equation ET+2 = Φu(ET) is unique and globally stable. We denote this steady-state E
p,u.
Hence, when ET > Φu(ET) (<), environmental quality deteriorates (improves).
Similarly, Φs(ET) is increasing and piecewise linear in ET. The slope of the function belongs
to the range [0, 1]. It follows that the solution of the equation ET+2 = Ψs(ET+1) is unique and
globally stable. We denote this steady-state Ep,s. Hence, when ET > Ψs(ET) (<), environmental
quality deteriorates (improves).
Let us determine under which conditions multiplicity may arise.
We define two threshold values on ET. First, Φu(ET+1) exists for all ET+2 < E˜
p. We deter-
mine define E
p
such that Φu(ET+1) = E˜
p. It follows that:
E
p
=
β(As + Au) + (Au− As)(1− 2λ)− 2(ατ p,u)θ(pi s − piu)− 2λ(As − Au)[(1−α)τ p,u]κ
2(pi s − piu)
(D.1)
Then, the dynamics is described by ET+2 = Φu for all Et < E
p
. Similarly, Φs(ET+1) holds
for all ET+2 ≥ E˜
p. Then, we define Ep such that Φs(ET+1) = E˜
p. Using equation (D.1) and
substituting τ p,u by τ p,s yields the value of Ep. Obviously, since τ p,s > τ p,u, then E
p
> Ep.
Finally, Φs(ET+1) holds for Et > E
p.
Once these two thresholds are defined, the dynamics exhibit the same properties as the one
described in Appendix B. Then, if we consider that expectations are no longer stationary, we
can define an area of indeterminacy, if Ep,s and Ep,u belong to [Ep, E
p
].
E Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix we aim at showing that for some values ofα, it could be the case that E˘(α) >
E
p
(α), thus implying that the implemented policy allows from escaping the low equilibrium.
First, let us study the properties of E˘(α).
E˘(α) =
βAsAu(1− 2λ)−β(1− λ)(As
2
+ Au
2
) + AsEu + As(ατ p,u)θ
As +β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
(E.1)
E˘(0) =
βAsAu(1− 2λ)−β(1− λ)(As
2
+ Au
2
) + AsEu
As +β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
(E.2)
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E˘(1) =
βAsAu(1− 2λ)−β(1− λ)(As
2
+ Au
2
) + AsEu + As(τ p,u)θ
As +β(As − Au)(pi s − piu)
, (E.3)
with E˘(1) > E˘(0). Moreover E˘(α) is increasing and monotonous over the rangeα ∈ [0, 1].
Second, let us analyse the properties of E
p
(α) and then study the impact of the parameter
α on this threshold value.
E
p
(0) =
β(As + Au) + (1− 2λ)(Au − As)
2(pi s − piu) + Au
(E.4)
and
E
p
(1) =
β(As + Au) + (1− 2λ)(Au − As)− 2(pi s − piu)(τ p,u)θ
2(pi s − piu) + Au
, (E.5)
with E
p
(0) > E
p
(1).
∂Ep
∂α =
[−(pi s − piu)(1−α)θ(ατ p,u)θ + λ(As − Au)κ(α −θ)[(1−α)τ p,u]κ ]
α(pi s − piu)(1−θ)(1−α)
(E.6)
The sign of ∂E
p
∂α depends on the value of α. Let us define g(α) = α
(1−κ)θ
1−θ σ(pi s − piu)θ(σpiuθ)
θ−κ
1−θ
and f (α) = λ(As − Au)κ(α −θ)(1−α)κ−1. Then,
sign
{
∂Ep
∂α
}
= sign {g(α)− f (α)} (E.7)
Studying the properties of each function, we can define α∗ such that: f (α) > g(α) (<), for
α > α∗ (<).
Indeed, g(0) = 0, g′(α) > 0 and lim g(α)α→1 = (pi
s − piu)θ(piuθ)
θ−κ
1−θ is finite. Moreover,
f (0) < 0, and lim f (α)α→1 = +∞. The sign of f
′(α) is positive for 0 < α < 1 if 1−θ(1−κ)
κ
< 1.
Yet, this conditions is always satisfied since κ < 1. Then, f ′(α) > 0. Finally, g(α) and f (α)
cross only once and we defineα∗ such that: f (α∗) = g(α∗).
We can deduce that if α > α∗ (<), then ∂E
p
∂α > 0 (<). Hence the thresholds E
p
(α) draws a
u-shaped pattern.
Finally, E˘(α) and E
p
(α) may cross twice of the slope of E˘(α) is lower than the slop of E
p
(α)
forα = 1. We have shown that ∂E˘(α)/∂α|α=1 is finite while ∂E
p
(α)/∂α|α=1 is infinite. Then we
can claim that:
∂E˘(α)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=1
<
∂Ep(α)
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
(E.8)
Then, if the distance between E
p
(1) and E˘(1) is not too large, the two functions may cross
twice, thus defining two threshold values,α1 andα2, withα1 < α2. In that case, E
p
(α) < E˘(α)
for α ∈ (α1,α2). In that case only, the policy will be efficient and allows the economy to jump
directly on the optimistic trajectory, Φs(ET+2). On the contrary, if the distance between E
p
(1)
and E˘(1) is too large, then the two functions do not cross, and the policy is never efficient.
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F Substitutability vs Complementarity
In this section, we want to prove that under a more standard production function our results
hold. In particular, let consider the following production function, so that skilled and unskilled
types of labour are no longer substitutable:
Yt = (A
sHt)
α(AuLt)
1−α, (F.1)
with α ∈ [0, 1]. Since the labour market is perfectly competitive, wages equal the marginal
productivity of each type of workforce:

ws =
αYt
Ht
wu =
αYt
Lt
(F.2)
Then, substituting the equations above into (9), we obtain the following expression:
z˜ =
(1− λ)(αLt − (1−α)Ht)
αLt
+ χ(
Ht
Lt
)1−α, (F.3)
with χ ≡
(pi s−piu)Eat+1
αA and A ≡ A
sαAu
(1−α)
.
Using (10) and (11) into the equation above, and the threshold value z˜ is the solution of the
following equation:
A(z) = B(z), (F.4)
with A(z) = zα(1− z)− (1− λ)(α − z) and B(z) = χz1−α(1− z)αα.
Let us now study the properties of A(z): A(0) < 0 and lim A(z)z→1 = (1− λ)(1−α)
∂A(z)
∂z = α(1− 2z) + (1− λ) (F.5)
with
∂A(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=0
= α + 1− λ and
∂A(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z→1
= −α + 1− λ (F.6)
and
∂2A(z)
∂z2 = −αz (F.7)
A(z) reaches a maximum for z = 1/2 + (1− λ)/α. Let us now study the properties of B(z):
B(0) = 0 and B(1) = 0. In addition,
∂B(z)
∂z = χαz
−α(1− z)α−1[1− z−α] (F.8)
with
∂B(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z→0
= +∞ and
∂B(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z→1
= −∞ (F.9)
and
∂2B(z)
∂z2 = −αχz
−α−1(1− z)α−2(1−α)(α + 2z) (F.10)
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B(z) reaches a maximum value for z = 1−α.
Given these properties, we can deduce that A(z) and B(z) cross only once for z ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, this threshold value increases with χ, and so with agents’ expectations with respect
to environmental conditions. Similarly to our case where the two labour force are complemen-
tary, in that case there exists a unique value of z such that, above this threshold, agents do not
invest in human capital.
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